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GREENWASHING NO MORE: THE CASE 
FOR STRONGER REGULATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING 
ROBIN M. ROTMAN*, CHLOE J. GOSSETT**, AND HOPE D. GOLDMAN*** 
Fraudulent and deceptive environmental claims in marketing (sometimes called 
“greenwashing”) are a persistent problem in the United States, despite nearly thirty years of 
efforts by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent it.  This Essay focuses on a 
recent trend in greenwashing—fraudulent “organic” claims for nonagricultural products, 
such as home goods and personal care products.  We offer three recommendations.  First, 
we suggest ways that the FTC can strengthen its oversight of “organic” claims for 
nonagricultural products and improve coordination with the USDA.  Second, we argue for 
inclusion of guidelines for “organic” claims in the next revision of the FTC’s Guidelines for 
the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (often referred to as the “Green Guides”), 
which the FTC is scheduled to revise in 2022.  Finally, we assert that the FTC should 
formalize the Green Guides as binding regulations, rather than their current form as 
nonbinding interpretive guidance, as the USDA has done for the National Organic Program 
(NOP) regulations.  This Essay concludes that more robust regulatory oversight of 
“organic” claims, together with efforts by the FTC to prevent other forms of greenwashing, 
will ultimately bolster demand for sustainable products and incentivize manufacturers to 
innovate to meet this demand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many of today’s consumers, particularly Millennials and Gen Z-ers, seek to 
purchase “sustainable” products and services, and some have expressed a 
willingness to pay a higher price for “eco-friendly” options.1  They should be 
encouraged to do so given the challenges of population growth, rising levels of 
consumption, heightened scarcity of some resources, and the compounding, 
deleterious effects of consumptive activities on environmental quality.  
Unsurprisingly, multinational, multibillion-dollar companies have promoted 
their sustainability initiatives in recent years.  For example, in 2018, Starbucks 
promised to eliminate plastic straws from its cafés by 2020,2 McDonalds 
pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 36% by 2030,3 and Nestlé 
committed to making “100% of its packaging recyclable or reusable by 2025.”4 
But can eco-consumers be sure they are getting what they pay 
for? 
The trend toward “green” consumerism in the United States began in the 
1970s and 1980s when many Americans developed a heightened awareness 
 
1.  Sonya Sachdeva et al., Green Consumerism: Moral Motivations to a Sustainable Future, 6 
CURRENT OP. PSYCHOL. 60, 60, 62 (2015). 
2. Christina Caron, Starbucks to Stop Using Plastic Disposable Straws by 2020, N.Y. TIMES (July 
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/business/starbucks-plastic-straws.html. 
3. Zlati Meyer, McDonald’s Plans Dramatic Cut in Greenhouse Gases, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 
2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/03/20/mcdonalds-plans-
cut-its-greenhouse-gas-emissions-36-2030/439755002/. 
4. Press Release, Nestlé, Nestlé Accelerates Action to Tackle Plastic Waste (Jan. 15, 
2019), https://www.nestle.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/nestle-action-tackle-pl
astic-waste. 
08. ALR 72.3_ROTMAN (ARTICLE) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2020  11:30 PM 
2020] THE CASE FOR STRONGER REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING 419 
of environmental issues.5  Manufacturers, and the marketing and advertising 
firms working for them, responded to this new consumer preference by 
touting the supposed environmental benefits of their products.  False or 
misleading environmental claims became more common, with some 
producers changing their labels and ad campaigns—and nothing else.6  This 
practice is known as “greenwashing.”7 
Unfortunately for consumers, fabricated environmental marketing claims 
can be more problematic than other forms of deceptive advertising because 
they are particularly difficult to substantiate.8  While consumers can 
determine, say, which brand of paper towels is more absorbent, they cannot 
readily verify whether the paper towels are organic or how long they will take 
to decompose in a landfill.  Environmental marketing claims are also 
complex due to the interconnected nature of environmental issues—
reducing one aspect of a company’s footprint does not mean that the totality 
of its operations are “green.” 
Despite these challenges, “green” consumerism continues to gain 
momentum.  “Green” goods have become a status symbol.  A 2007 New York 
Times article reported that the number one reason for purchasing a Prius is 
that “it makes a statement about me” because “it shows the world that its 
owner cares.”9  In a similar vein, a 2010 study found that consumers are 
motivated to purchase “green” products when they believe it will elevate their 
social status.10  And among young adults between ages eighteen and thirty, a 
2014 study showed emotion often motivates “green” purchasing decisions.11 
 
 
5. See David Gibson, Comment, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental 
Advertising, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 426, 428–29 (2009); see also EPA, ASSESSING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET 3–4 (1991) (reviewing surveys in the 1990s of 
Americans’ increased environmental awareness). 
6. See Roger D. Wynne, Note, Defining “Green”: Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing 
Claims, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 785, 787 (1991). 
7. For a discussion on types of greenwashing and its potential consequences, see Nick 
Feinstein, Note, Learning from Past Mistakes: Future Regulation to Prevent Greenwashing, 40 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2013). 
8. See Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE 
J. ON REG. 147, 150 (1993). 
9. See Micheline Maynard, Say ‘Hybrid’ and Many People Will Hear ‘Prius’, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/business/04hybrid.html (comparing the 
hybrid-electric Prius vehicle to the rubber “issue bracelets” that show support for specific causes). 
10. Vladas Griskevicius et al., Going Green to be Seen: Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous 
Conservation, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 392, 399 (2010). 
11. See Maturos Kanchanapibul et al., An Empirical Investigation of Green Purchase Behaviour 
Among the Young Generation, 66 J. CLEANER PROD. 528, 528, 533 (2014). 
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This Essay argues that existing laws and regulations—facially and as-
applied—do not fully prevent deceptive environmental claims in marketing.  
Part II examines the history of state and federal regulation of environmental 
marketing, focusing on the Guidelines for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims 
(often referred to as the “Green Guides”) issued by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC or Commission).  Part III focuses on the latest trend in 
greenwashing—fraudulent “organic” claims for nonagricultural products 
(such as home goods and personal care products).  Part IV offers three 
recommendations: (1) increased FTC oversight and improved coordination 
with the USDA, (2) inclusion of guidelines for “organic” claims in the next 
revision of the Green Guides (slated for 2022), and (3) formalizing the Green 
Guides as binding legislative rules rather than an interpretive guidance 
document.  This Essay concludes that more robust regulatory control over 
“organic” claims will not only prevent fraud but will also bolster consumer 
demand for sustainable goods and services generally, and incentivize 
manufacturers to innovate to meet this demand. 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
MARKETING 
This section reviews the history of regulating “green” marketing, 
beginning with the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) 
in 1914, which established the FTC’s broad mandate to prevent deceptive 
marketing; the development of disparate state regulations regarding 
environmental marketing in the 1970s and 1980s; issuance of the Green 
Guides by the FTC in 1992; and recent developments.12  This section shows 
that, although the FTC’s oversight of environmental claims in marketing 
has strengthened over time, gaps remain, which are detrimental to 
manufacturers and consumers alike. 
 
 
12. It should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promulgated 
industry-specific rules and guidelines for environmental claims in the automotive, home 
appliance, and residential construction sectors; however, those rules are outside the scope of 
this paper.  See, e.g., FTC Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Automobiles, 
16 C.F.R. § 259.2 (2019); FTC Energy Labeling Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 305.4(a) (2019); FTC 
Automotive Fuel Ratings, Certification & Posting Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 306.10 (2019); FTC Rule 
on Alternative Fuels and Alternative Fueled Vehicles, 16 C.F.R. § 309.2 (2019); FTC 
Recycled Oil Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 311.6 (2019); FTC Labeling and Advertising of Home 
Insulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 460.12 (2019). 
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A. The Early Days 
Deceptive business practices and misleading marketing claims have 
existed for as long as there has been commercial activity.  As such, the United 
States has had laws protecting consumers and regulating commerce since the 
1700s.  The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “fix the 
Standard of Weights and Measures,” highlighting the early importance of 
protecting consumers from deceptive practices.13  As businesses and the U.S. 
economy evolved, so did the country’s needs for different types of consumer 
protection.  In 1914, Congress passed the FTC Act.14  The FTC Act 
established the FTC and charged it with preventing anticompetitive, 
deceptive, or unfair business practices.15 
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce” and serves as the principal federal law promoting 
truth in advertising and other marketing materials.16  The FTC deems 
actions to be “decept[ive]” if there is “a representation, omission or practice 
that [misleads] the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the 
consumer’s detriment.”17  Section 5 enumerates the various enforcement 
tools at the FTC’s disposal.18  The most commonly used remedy for unfair 
or deceptive marketing is a cease and desist order.19  The FTC may also 
pursue penalties or order corrective advertising.20 
 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
14. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 31, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). 
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to 
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition 
in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”). 
16. See id. § 45(a)(1) (declaring unlawful “unfair methods of competition”). 
17. FTC, Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), appended to Cliffdale Associates, 
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/commission_d
ecision_volumes/volume-103/ftc_volume_decision_103_january_-_june_1984pages_103-
203.pdf.  In 2015, the FTC issued an “Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted 
Advertisements.”  The main purpose of the 2015 Policy Statement was to address deceptive 
formatting in advertising, and it reaffirmed the definition of “deceptive” first articulated in the 
1983 Policy Statement.  FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY 
FORMATTED ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (2015). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)–(m). 
19. See DEE PRIDGEN ET AL., CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 12:1 (2019–2020 
ed. 2019) (“The primary remedy of the FTC is the cease-and-desist orders.  These orders 
constitute a staple ingredient of FTC enforcement.  It is also the remedy that has been in 
existence for the longest period of time.”). 
20. The FTC may order corrective advertising if the prohibition of future misrepresentations 
does not sufficiently dispel consumer misperceptions.  See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 
749, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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With the rise of green consumerism in the 1970s, and the corresponding 
rise in greenwashing, the FTC began deploying its enforcement tools to 
address unsubstantiated and misleading environmental claims.  Early efforts 
largely focused on claims of “biodegradable” products.  For instance, in 
1973, the FTC negotiated with the detergent industry to establish an 
industry-wide standard for marketing statements relating to biodegradability 
and phosphorus content of detergents.21  That same year, the FTC issued a 
cease and desist order against a milk carton company that had fraudulently 
claimed its cartons were “completely biodegradable.”22  In the 1980s, with 
concerns about the depleting ozone layer, the FTC issued cease and desist 
orders against marketers that had wrongfully claimed their products were 
“ozone friendly.”23 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission pursued enforcement 
actions against fraudulent environmental marketing claims based on its 
general authority under § 5 of the FTC Act.  The FTC implemented these 
initial enforcement efforts piecemeal, under general policy, which led to a 
climate of frustration for both industry and consumers.  At the same time, 
states were promulgating their own regulations to address the growing 
problem of fraudulent environmental claims in marketing, and state 
Attorneys General and consumer groups were enforcing these regulations in 
state courts.  Ultimately, these fragmented efforts made it apparent that the 
FTC needed to issue nationwide guidance regarding environmental claims 
in marketing. 
 
21. For a discussion of the “Voluntary Guideline Agreement” with the detergent 
industry, see 1974 FTC ANN. REP. 31, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/r
eports_annual/annual-report-1974/ar1974_0.pdf; see also Roscoe B. Starek, III, Former 
Comm’r, FTC, Remarks at The Alliance for Beverage Cartons and the Environment 
Symposium (Dec. 4, 1996), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1996/12/federal-trade-
commissions-green-guides-success-story. 
22. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36, 38 (1973), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-82/ftc_volume_decision_82_january_-
_june_1973pages_1-53.pdf#page=36.   
23. See, e.g., Tech Spray, Inc., 115 F.T.C. 433, 434–35 (1992), https://www.ftc.gov/site
s/default/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-115/ftc_volume_decision
_115_january_-_december_1992pages_433-559.pdf (finding that spray-on cleaning products 
marketed as “ozone friendly” in fact they contained ozone-depleting chemicals); Zipatone Inc., 
114 F.T.C. 376, 377 (1991), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/commission_
decision_volumes/volume-114/ftc_volume_decision_114__january_-_december_1991pages
_367-485.pdf (discovering spray-on cement product marketed as “ecologically safe” in reality 
contained an ozone-depleting substance). 
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B. Calls for a National Standard 
In the absence of controlling federal rules, many states created their own 
green marketing laws by the early 1990s to address rampant misleading and 
unfounded environmental claims.  While consumer groups applauded the 
laws, the nonuniformity of the laws caused frustration for manufacturers.  
States adopted different standards, which then interfered with interstate 
commerce.24  In part, this was a question of stringency, with California 
leading the charge—as is often the case when it comes to environmental 
regulations.  In Pennsylvania, a proposed bill allowed a product to be labeled 
“biodegradable” if it decomposed after any length of time,25 whereas in 
California, the term could be used only if the product decomposed within 
one year.26  Yet, other states banned use of terms entirely.  For instance, 
Rhode Island prohibited “biodegradable” claims in product marketing,27 
complicating the nationwide marketing of biodegradable products. 
In 1990, both the National Association of Attorneys General and the 
National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators were calling for 
nationwide regulation of “green marketing.”28  Both groups adopted similar 
resolutions requesting that the FTC promulgate environmental marketing 
guidelines under federal law.29  Similarly, a task force of ten state Attorneys 
General published reports in 1990 and 1991 calling for national 
environmental marketing standards.30  Environmental groups also called for  
 
 
24. See David F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State 
Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 995, 1017–18 (1993). 
25. S. 920, 175th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Pa. 1991). 
26. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17,508.5 (West Supp. 1993) (repealed 1995). 
27. See Welsh, supra note 24, at 1002 (describing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.14-3 (Supp. 
1991), which banned the use of the term biodegradable).  This law has since been repealed.  
See Act of July 13, 2000, ch. 282, § 2, 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws 1519–20. 
28. See Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides; Public 
Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968, 24,969 (May 31, 1991). 
29. See id. at 24,968–69 (“By resolution adopted March 20, 1990 by the National 
Association of Attorneys General, the State Attorneys General requested that the FTC, in 
cooperation with the States and [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)], develop uniform 
national guidelines.  A similar resolution was adopted by the National Association of 
Consumer Agency Administrators.”); see also NAAG Urges National Strategy on Energy Shortages, 
Environmental Marketing Claims, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 424 (Mar. 22, 1990). 
30. CAL. ATT’Y GEN. ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ADVERTISING 8–9 (1990); CAL. ATT’Y GEN. ET AL., 
THE GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
ADVERTISING 1 (1991). 
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this type of regulation.31  Additionally, the Interagency Task Force on 
Environmental Marketing Claims was formed between the FTC, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the White House Office of 
Consumer Affairs (OCA) to facilitate coordination between federal agencies 
on this issue.32  It seemed that all interested parties—from consumers, to 
industry professionals, to environmental groups, to the regulators 
themselves—agreed that some form of a national standard was necessary. 
C. The Green Guides 
By May 1991, the FTC had received four petitions for rulemaking,33 in 
addition to other informal requests,34 asking that it promulgate a uniform 
national standard for environmental claims in marketing.  From these 
petitions and requests, the FTC began the rulemaking process.  The FTC 
held a two-day public hearing in July 1991, along with an extended comment 
period lasting 120 days.35  In the Federal Register notice soliciting public 
comment, the Commission asked for comments on “what form” the 
environmental marketing standards should take—ranging from increased 
enforcement of § 5 of the FTC Act on a case-by-case basis, to interpretative 
guidance, to binding regulations.36 
The FTC ultimately settled on an interpretative guidance approach.  In 
1992, the Commission, acting pursuant to its authority under § 5, issued the 
 
31. See Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides; Public 
Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. at 24,969 (“In addition, environmental groups have called for 
guidance on environmental marketing claims . . . . [e].g. Environmental Action Foundation 
Press Release, ‘Solid Waste Expert Urges State Action Against Bogus “Green Market” 
Products’ (March 14, 1990).”). 
32. Id. at 24,968. 
33. Id. at 24,969–70.  The petitions were filed by: Mobil Chemical Co. in September 
1990; First Brands Corp. on February 5, 1991; the National Food Processors Association and 
ten other trade associations on February 14, 1991; and the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance 
Association with the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association on April 12, 1991.  Id. 
34. Id. at 24,968–69; see also Manufacturers, Retailers Petition FTC to Adopt Uniform Labeling 
Guidelines, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Feb. 21, 1991). 
35. Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,026, 
37,026 (Aug. 2, 1991). 
36. Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides; Public Hearings, 56 
Fed. Reg. at 24,968.  The FTC notes that the three possible forms of guidance in this case 
include: “(1) Increased enforcement of Section 5 on a case-by-case basis and enhanced 
dissemination of the decisions in such cases; (2) issuance of a trade regulation rule, a binding 
regulation; and/or (3) issuance of interpretive guides, or guidelines as they sometimes are 
called.”  Id. 
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Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, frequently referred to as the 
“Green Guides.”37  The Green Guides are the FTC’s interpretation of the 
FTC Act as it applies to environmental claims in marketing.38  They were 
subsequently revised in 1996, 1998, and 2012.39 
The Green Guides are interpretive guidelines that advise marketers on 
how to properly make environmental claims.  They set forth general 
principles that apply to environmental claims about products, packaging, or 
services, when the claims are made in the marketing or sale of an item or 
service to the public.40  These principles direct marketers to: 
1. Use appropriate qualifications and disclosures regarding 
environmental claims.  Disclosures should be “clear and 
prominent,” in “plain language and sufficiently large type,” located 
in “close proximity to the qualified claim.”  Marketers should 
“avoid making inconsistent statements or using distracting 
elements that could undercut or contradict the disclosure.”41 
2. Make clear whether their claim pertains to the entirety of a 
product, just one component of the product, or just the packaging.  
The Green Guides provide the following example: 
A plastic package containing a new shower curtain is labeled “recyclable” 
without further elaboration.  Because the context of the claim does not make 
clear whether it refers to the plastic package or the shower curtain, the claim is 
deceptive if any part of either the package or the curtain, other than minor, 
incidental components, cannot be recycled.42 
3. Avoid overstating environmental attributes or benefits.  The Green 
Guides provide the following example: “An area rug is labeled 
‘50% more recycled content than before.’  The manufacturer 
increased the recycled content of its rug from 2% recycled fiber to 
3%.  Although the claim is technically true, it likely conveys the 
false impression that the manufacturer has increased significantly 




37. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363, 
36,363 (Aug. 13, 1992).  The Green Guides are currently codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (2019). 
38. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 
63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010). 
39. See 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311 (Oct. 11, 1996); 63 Fed. Reg. 24,240 (May 1, 1998); 77 
Fed. Reg. 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012). 
40. 16 C.F.R. § 260.1(c). 
41. Id. § 260.3(a). 
42. Id. § 260.3(b). 
43. Id. § 260.3(c). 
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4. Ensure that comparative claims are clear and substantiated.  The 
Green Guides provide the following example: 
An advertiser notes that its glass bathroom tiles contain “20% more recycled 
content.”  Depending on the context, the claim could be a comparison either to 
the advertiser’s immediately preceding product or to its competitors’ products.  
The advertiser should have substantiation for both interpretations.  Otherwise, 
the advertiser should make the basis for comparison clear, for example, by saying 
“20% more recycled content than our previous bathroom tiles.”44 
Marketers must adhere to these principles, regardless of whether the 
environmental claims are “asserted directly or by implication.”45 
In addition to setting forth general environmental marketing principles, 
the Green Guides consider how consumers are likely to interpret particular 
claims and how, in turn, marketers can appropriately substantiate or qualify 
their claims to avoid deceiving consumers.  The Green Guides state that 
environmental claims must be supported by a “reasonable basis.”46  They 
explain that meeting the reasonable basis standard often requires scientific 
evidence in the context of environmental claims.47 
The Green Guides, by their own terms, are not binding regulations.48  
Rather, they “help marketers avoid making environmental marketing 
claims that are unfair or deceptive under § 5 of the FTC Act”49 by providing 
“a ‘safe harbor’ for marketers who want certainty about how to make 
environmental claims.”50 
To put this in context, the FTC’s rulemaking power under § 18 of the 
FTC Act provides that the Commission may promulgate two different kinds 
of rules—interpretive rules and legislative rules.51  The FTC categorizes the 
Green Guides as interpretive rules, meaning that they are “general 
statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
 
44. Id. § 260.3(d). 
45. Id. § 260.1(c). 
46. See id. § 260.2 (“Marketers must ensure that all reasonable interpretations of their claims 
are truthful, not misleading, and supported by a reasonable basis before they make the claims.”). 
47. Id.  
48. See id. § 260.1(a) (“The guides . . . do not confer any rights on any person and do not 
operate to bind the FTC or the public.”). 
49. Id. 
50. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363, 36,364 
(Aug. 13, 1992). 
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (“[T]he Commission may prescribe-- (A) interpretive rules 
and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce . . . and (B) rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”). 
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affecting commerce.”52  Legislative rules, by contrast, “define with specificity 
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive . . . in or affecting 
commerce.”53  A full analysis of the differences between interpretative and 
legislative rules, and the scholarship surrounding this topic, is beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, it is appropriate to briefly consider the 
significance of interpretative and legislative rules in the FTC context. 
Legislative rules are subject to the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act,54 as well as additional procedural requirements prescribed in 
§ 18(b)(1) of the FTC Act and in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act (FTC Improvement Act), which was 
passed in 1975.55  Congress passed the FTC Improvement Act in the wake 
of several controversial FTC rulemakings.  These additional procedural 
hurdles are intended to, and generally do, slow the FTC rulemaking 
process.56  Since the passage of the FTC Improvement Act, the FTC has 
issued fewer binding rules,57 and instead has increasingly relied on 
interpretive rules or industry guides, such as the Green Guides, to avoid the  
 
 
52. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(A); see also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 
Fed. Reg. 63,552, 63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010) (“Industry guides, such as these, are administrative 
interpretations of the law.  Therefore, they do not have the force and effect of law and are not 
independently enforceable.”). 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B). 
54. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570a, 701–706. 
55. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Improvement Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a).  The FTC 
must begin the rulemaking process by publishing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPRM) in the Federal Register that contains certain information and invites comments and 
alternative suggestions.  The FTC must also submit this ANPRM to certain Senate and House 
committees.  In addition, before the FTC can issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the 
agency must “make a determination that unfair or deceptive acts or practices are prevalent,” 
which it is permitted to do only if “it has issued cease and desist orders regarding such acts or 
practices,” or “any other information available to the [FTC] indicates a widespread pattern 
of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”  15 U.S.C. § 57a(b); see also TODD GARVEY, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2017), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41546. 
56. In the wake of these new requirements, “it soon became clear that the Magnuson-
Moss rulemaking process was too slow to be of much use.”  PRIDGEN ET AL., supra note 19, 
§§ 12:12–14 (discussing procedural burdens imposed pursuant to the FTC Improvement 
Act).  It should be noted that there is an exception to this lengthier process; however, the 
FTC is subject only to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking procedures if 
Congress expressly directs the FTC to promulgate the rule in question.  See id. 
57. Id. at § 12:8. 
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cumbersome FTC Improvement Act requirements.58  These industry 
guidelines occupy a middle ground between being truly voluntary and 
legally binding. 
The FTC’s decision to tackle deceptive and fraudulent “green” marketing 
using an industry guide, rather than a binding regulation, enabled the FTC 
to more quickly address the problem at a time when it was under pressure by 
various stakeholders to do so.  While the expedited action was a significant 
advantage, this approach caused other challenges. 
First, voluntary federal guidelines do not preempt disparate state 
regulations.  The Green Guides expressly state that they “do not preempt 
federal, state, or local laws.”59  Although some state laws now adopt by 
reference the Green Guides in some manner,60 the issue of disparate state 
regulations still is not entirely resolved.61 
Second, despite that the Green Guides expressly state that they are not 
binding regulations, they read like binding regulations and the FTC has 
sometimes treated them like binding regulations.  The Green Guides classify 
certain practices as “deceptive” and describe what marketers “should” and 
“should not” do when making environmental claims in order to comply with 
§ 5 of the FTC Act.  These specific directions are arguably inconsistent with 
a “general statement[] of policy,”62 as an interpretive rule is supposed to be, 
and instead “define with specificity [unfair] acts or practices,”63 as legislative 
rules do.  To this end, former FTC Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga issued 
a statement of dissent upon the release of the Green Guides in 1992, 
questioning whether the Green Guides were legislative rules masquerading 
as interpretative guidance.64 
 
58. Grodsky, supra note 8, at 171.  The FTC’s rulemaking history is discussed in detail in 
PRIDGEN ET AL., supra note 19, § 12:12.  See also Cooper J. Spinelli, Note, Far from Fair, Farther 
from Efficient: The FTC and the Hyper-Formalization of Informal Rulemaking, 6 LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF 
129, 133–34 (2014). 
59. 16 C.F.R. § 260.1(b) (2019). 
60. For example, Maine, Rhode Island, and Michigan have all incorporated by reference 
the Green Guides into state law in some manner.  In Maine and Rhode Island, a violation of 
the Green Guides constitutes a violation of state law (even though, ironically, it does not 
constitute a violation of federal law).  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2019); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.3-1 (West 2014); 
(codifying into state law many of the Green Guides requirements). 
61. See Feinstein, supra note 7, at 255. 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A). 
63. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). 
64. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Concerning Issuance of 
Commission Guides on Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363, 36,368–69 
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A third problem with the interpretive guidance approach is the difficulty 
with enforcement.  The FTC Act is the sole piece of legislation that grants 
the Commission statutory powers of enforcement over deceptive advertising 
and other forms of marketing.  Because the Green Guides are nonbinding, 
they “are not independently enforceable.”65  Therefore, a violation of the 
Green Guides is not a violation of a legally binding rule pursuant to the FTC 
Act, and the FTC is burdened with proving that each Green Guides violation 
also violates § 5 of the FTC Act.  A related issue is that voluntary guidelines 
typically are not viewed as final agency actions, which both complicates 
judicial review and reduces judicial deference to the FTC’s determination 
that a marketer has violated § 5.66 
In sum, the Green Guides were intended to curb the growing problem of 
deceptive and fraudulent “green” marketing in the United States, and they 
have succeeded in doing so in many respects.  Companies marketing 
products or services have a clearer roadmap for compliance with § 5 of the 
FTC Act, and American consumers can be more confident that they are not 
being “greenwashed.”  This confidence, in turn, leads to higher demand for 
sustainable products and can reduce the negative impacts of consumption on 
environmental quality. 
The form of the Green Guides as an interpretive guidance document, 
rather than a binding regulation, leads to several challenges in compliance 
and enforcement.  The substantive purview of the Green Guides is also a 
factor.  While the Green Guides respond to some of the most significant 
environmental marketing deceptions of the past—such as claims of being 
“ozone-layer friendly”—they are silent on one of the issues that matters most 
to today’s consumers: “organic” claims.  The next section of this Essay 
discusses the rise of fraud in organic claims, particularly for nonagricultural 
products. 
 
(Aug. 13, 1992) (“Even in the presence of express language disavowing agency intent to bind 
either itself or the public, courts in this circuit have considered whether allegedly interpretive 
rules are sufficiently mandatory and definitive to render them legislative in nature.”). 
65. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 
63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010) (“The Commission, however, can take action under the FTC Act if a 
marketer makes an environmental claim inconsistent with the Guides.  In any such 
enforcement action, the Commission must prove that the challenged act or practice is unfair 
or deceptive.”). 
66. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (holding that agency actions are 
final only if they (1) constitute the “‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision making process” 
and (2) impose “‘rights or obligations’ . . . from which ‘legal consequences will flow’”).  See 
generally Stephen Hylas, Note, Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1644 (2017) (discussing the challenges in implementing the Bennett test). 
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II. DECEPTION AND FRAUD REGARDING “ORGANIC” CLAIMS 
The FTC has jurisdiction over most claims made in interstate commerce,67 
and this broad mandate encompasses claims regarding the environmental 
attributes of products or services.  As a practical matter, however, the FTC has 
historically deferred to the USDA regarding “organic” claims.  Because the 
USDA focuses on agricultural products, this has led to a regulatory gap in 
oversight of “organic” claims for nonagricultural products, such as 
manufactured goods.68  This section discusses the potential for fraud in these 
types of claims and recent FTC enforcement action that begins to address it. 
A. Gaps in Oversight and Enforcement 
An Interagency Memorandum of Understanding among the FTC, 
USDA, and the U.S. Department of Justice, executed in 1999, defines the 
agencies’ joint approach to oversight of competitive conditions in the 
agricultural marketplace.69  Despite this effort at coordination, the agencies’ 
concurrent jurisdiction has led to confusion and gaps in enforcement 
regarding deceptive or fraudulent marketing. 
The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service administers the National 
Organic Program (NOP), which in pertinent part sets binding regulations 
for the marketing of domestic agricultural products (in contrast to the 
purportedly nonbinding Green Guides).70  The NOP regulations define 
“organic” and provide for certification of agricultural ingredients produced 
 
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (stating the Commission may prevent persons, partnerships, 
or corporations except for some banks, savings, and loan institutions from using unfair 
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts). 
68. Agricultural and nonagricultural products are discussed at length in this Essay.  7 
U.S.C. § 6503(a) prescribes that the “[t]he Secretary [of USDA] shall establish an organic 
certification program for producers and handlers of agricultural products that have been 
produced using organic methods as provided for in this chapter.”  An agricultural product is 
defined as “[a]ny agricultural commodity or product, whether raw or processed, including 
any commodity or product derived from livestock, that is marketed in the United States for 
human or livestock consumption.”  7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2019). 
69. Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Just. & the 
FTC & the USDA on Cooperation with Respect to Monitoring Competitive Conditions in 
the Agric. Marketplace (Sept. 16, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/coop
eration_agreements/ftcdojdoa-mou.pdf. 
70. See 7 C.F.R. § 205 (outlining the National Organic Program (NOP)); see also Guidance 
and Instructions for Accredited Certifying Agents and Certified Operations, USDA, https://www.ams.usd
a.gov/rules-regulations/organic/handbook (last visited Aug. 12, 2020) (containing more 
information about organic standards and certification). 
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under conditions that meet the definition.  The NOP regulations also 
include labeling standards based on the percentage of organic ingredients 
in a product.71  Under the NOP, the USDA can suspend or revoke organic 
certifications and impose civil penalties for noncompliance.72  Although the 
NOP sets national standards for “organic” agricultural products, many 
types of products and services that are marketed as “organic” are not 
covered by the NOP—for example, home goods (e.g., mattresses, pillows), 
personal care products (e.g., soaps, shampoos, skin creams), and dry 
cleaning services.73 
During the latest revision of the Green Guides, which began in 2007 and 
was completed in 2012, the FTC considered adding guidance for “organic” 
claims.74  It ultimately decided not to do so for two reasons.  First, the FTC 
determined that “organic” claims for agricultural products were sufficiently 
covered by the NOP.  The FTC explained that it “want[ed] to avoid 
providing advice that is duplicative or inconsistent with the USDA’s [NOP], 
which provides a comprehensive regulatory framework governing organic 
claims for agricultural products.”75  Second, the FTC decided that there was 
insufficient evidence of the potential for consumer deception: “For organic 
claims outside the NOP’s jurisdiction, and for sustainable and natural claims,  
 
 
71. 7 C.F.R. § 205.300–.311. 
72. Id. § 205.662(g)(1). 
73. Readers may be wondering about the role of the FDA with regard to “organic” 
products.  In brief, the FDA does not regulate use of the term “organic” on food labels, cosmetics, 
or other products under its jurisdiction.  While the FDA regulates other aspects of these products 
pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling 
Act, it defers to the USDA NOP on use of the term “organic.”  See “Organic” Cosmetics, FDA (Mar. 
8, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-labeling-claims/organic-cosmetics. 
74. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 
63,581 (Oct. 15, 2010) (“The Commission asked commenters to discuss whether and how the 
Guides should be modified to address the use of environmental marketing claims that either 
are new or were not common during the last Guides review.  Commenters discussed five types 
of claims: (1) sustainable; (2) organic/natural; (3) made with renewable materials; (4) made 
with renewable energy; and (5) carbon offsets.”); see also Guides for the Use of Environmental 
Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122, 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012) (describing how the agency’s 
final rule was changed as a result of the comments received); Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues 
Revised “Green Guides” (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Green Guides Press Release], 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides 
(explaining that the FTC declined to address use of the term “organic” in the Guides because 
the agency wanted to avoid issuing a guidance that contradicts USDA). 
75. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,124; see 
also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,585–86. 
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the Commission lacks sufficient evidence on which to base general 
guidance.”76 
The purported “lack of evidence” regarding fraud and deception in 
“organic” marketing of nonagricultural products prompted the FTC and 
USDA to co-fund a study aimed at better understanding consumer 
perception of such claims.  The Joint Staff Report summarizing the study 
stated that “FTC staff initiated the study to determine whether to 
recommend updates to the FTC’s Guides for the Use of Environmental 
Marketing Claims.”77  The Report noted that “[a]lthough NOP regulates 
organic claims for agricultural products, products either partially or entirely 
consisting of non-agricultural components do not generally fall within the 
core of the USDA’s program, and the FTC’s Guides currently do not provide 
guidance regarding organic claims for such products.”78 
The Report, an internet-based study, surveyed over 8,000 individuals.79  
The study tested consumer perception of what an “organic” claim implies 
about the content of a nonagricultural product.80  It also tested consumer 
beliefs regarding the regulation of “organic” claims.81 
In pertinent part, the study found that a “significant proportion” of 
consumers surveyed believe that if a nonagricultural product contains even 
trace amounts of man-made chemicals, then an unqualified “organic” claim 
for that product is misleading.82  Also noteworthy were the study’s findings 
regarding perceptions of government regulation.  Approximately “30% of 
[respondents] believe[d]”—incorrectly—“that ‘organic’ claims for [] 
 
76. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,124; see also 
Press Release, FTC, supra note 74 (“[E]ither because the FTC lacks a sufficient basis to provide 
meaningful guidance or wants to avoid proposing guidance that duplicates or contradicts rules 
or guidance of other agencies, the Guides do not address use of the terms ‘sustainable,’ ‘natural,’ 
and ‘organic.’”); Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,586 
(stating that the Commission cannot prohibit marketers from using the term “natural” in the 
absence of evidence that demonstrates use of the term is always deceptive). 
77. BUREAU OF ECON. & BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FTC, CONSUMER PERCEPTION 





79. Id. at 5, 7. 
80. Id. at 10–12, 14. 
81. Id. at 10–12. 
82. Id. at 31. 
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shampoo[s] [and] mattresses are certified by the USDA.”83  The Joint Staff 
Report concluded the study results were “sufficiently robust to consider these 
organic issues further.”84 
To this end, the Report announced that “the FTC and USDA [would] 
hold a public roundtable . . . to explore organic claims for non-food 
products, and how we can work together to reduce deceptive organic 
claims.”85  The roundtable took place in October 2016 with industry 
members, environmental groups, government agencies, and academics in 
attendance.  Participants emphasized the importance of maintaining the 
integrity of “organic” claims not only for consumer protection but also to 
maintain fair competition in the market.86  For example, Scott Faber, Vice 
President for Government Affairs for Environmental Working Group, 
explained that many consumers misunderstand “organic” claims when they 
are made in reference to nonagricultural products.87  Additionally, Angela 
Jagiello, Associate Director of Conference and Product Development at the 
Organic Trade Association (OTA), noted that in an OTA survey, 60% of 
participants strongly agreed that “a certification process such as the USDA 
uses to oversee and enforce the labeling of organic foods should also be used 
to oversee and enforce the labeling of organic non-food, and products and 
services.”88  At the same time that the FTC was conducting the consumer 
study and public roundtable, it was also preparing to bring its first 
enforcement actions for deceptive “organic” claims, as described in the 
following section. 
 
83. Id. at 38.  Approximately 36–40% of respondents did not believe these products were 
regulated by the USDA, and the remainder of respondents reported being unsure.  Id. 
84. Id. at 4.  The study also surveyed consumer perception of “recycled content” claims, 
and ultimately determined that further FTC guidance on that subject was not necessary.  Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See Consumer Perceptions of “Organic” Claims Roundtable, FTC (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/10/consumer-perceptions-
organic-claims-ftc-usda-roundtable; see also Transcript for FTC Organic Claims Roundtable, 
Segment 1, FTC (Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter FTC Roundtable Transcript Part 1], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/consumer-perceptions-organic-
claims-roundtable-part-1/ftc_organic_claims_roundtable_-_transcript_segment_1.pdf; 
Transcript for FTC Organic Claims Roundtable, Segment 2, FTC (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/consumer-perceptions-organic-
claims-roundtable-part-2/ftc_organic_claims_roundtable_-_transcript_segment_2.pdf. 
87. FTC Roundtable Transcript Part1, supra note 86. 
88. Id. 
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B. In the Matter of Moonlight Slumber, LLC and FTC v.  
Truly Organic Inc. 
The potential for consumer confusion or deception surrounding “organic” 
claims for nonagricultural products, as documented by the FTC/USDA 
study and roundtable, proved to be well-founded.  In 2017, the FTC brought 
its first enforcement action for fraudulent “organic” claims in In the Matter of 
Moonlight Slumber, LLC.89  Two years later, the FTC brought its second 
enforcement action for fraudulent “organic” claims in FTC v. Truly Organic 
Inc.,90 and recovered over $1.75 million in penalties.91 
To be clear, the FTC has been actively combating other forms of 
greenwashing for years, and those cases inform the FTC’s current approach 
towards fraudulent “organic” claims.  For example, in 2013, the court 
ordered marketers of a fuel additive to pay $800,000 in consumer redress 
due to unsubstantiated claims that their Enviro Tabs would increase fuel 
efficiency and reduce air emissions.92  In 2014, the FTC settled charges 
against a diaper manufacturer that had falsely claimed its products were 
“100% biodegradable,” “‘certified’ biodegradable,” and “compostable.”93  
That same year, the FTC entered a Consent Order with a manufacturer of 
plastic lumber that had “misled consumers and distributors about the 
recycled content, post-consumer recycled content, and recyclability of its  
 
 
89. 164 F.T.C. 869 (2017) (Complaint), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/co
mmission_decision_volumes/volume-164/vol164complete.pdf.   
90. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Truly 
Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2019).  
91. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment; Order 
Closing Case at 3, FTC v. Truly Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2019). 
92. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment Against Green 
Foot Global, LLC, William C. Hyman, and Mary Ann P. Hyman at 3, 4–6, FTC v. Green 
Foot Glob., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-02064 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2013); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC 
Sends Refunds to Consumers Duped by Marketers Who Claimed Fuel Additive Could 
Drastically Increase Fuel Economy and Reduce Emissions (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.ftc.g
ov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-sends-refunds-consumers-duped-marketers-who-
claimed-fuel. 
93. Down to Earth Designs, Inc., 157 F.T.C. 476, 510–13 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sy
stem/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-157/ftc_volume_decision_157
_jan_-_jun_2014pages_462-630.pdf; see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Order 
Settling Charges that Down to Earth Designs, Inc. Made Deceptive Environmental Claims for 
its Diapers and Related Products (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/03/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-down-earth-designs-inc. 
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products.”94  Another case of note, from 2016, involved an FTC cease and 
desist order against a sunscreen manufacturer that had falsely claimed its 
product was “100% natural.”95  And finally, in 2018, the FTC entered a 
Consent Order in In the Matter of Benjamin Moore & Co., Inc.96  The paint 
company falsely claimed that its products would not emit volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) or other harmful chemicals and marketed its products 
using self-awarded environmental seals.97 
What sets Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic apart is that they were the 
first enforcement actions by the FTC to tackle the burgeoning problem of 
false or deceptive “organic claims.”  In 2017, the FTC issued a four-count 
complaint against Moonlight Slumber, LLC (Moonlight Slumber), an Illinois 
corporation that manufactures baby mattresses and maternity pillows at its 
factory near Chicago, and sells them throughout the United States.98  The 
complaint was based on the FTC’s authority to prevent deceptive claims in 
marketing under § 5(a) of the FTC Act.99  The claims alleged included: 
1. Moonlight Slumber had falsely advertised its baby mattresses as 
“organic,” “natural,” and “plant-based.”100 
 
 
94. N.E.W. Plastics Corp., 157 F.T.C. 900, 922 (2014); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC 
Approves Final Order Settling Charges That N.E.W. Plastics’ Claims for Its Plastic Lumber 
Products Were Misleading (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/04/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-new-plastics. 
95. Cal. Naturel, Inc., 162 F.T.C. 1066, 1070–71 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/fil
es/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-162/vol162complete.pdf; see also Press 
Release, FTC, FTC Rules California Naturel, Inc. Misled Consumers, Violated the FTC Act 
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/ftc-rules-california-
naturel-inc-misled-consumers-violated-ftc. 
96. 165 F.T.C. 731 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/commission_de
cision_volumes/volume-165/ftc_volume_decision_165_jan_-_jun_2018pages_725-969.pdf. 
97. Id. at 750–52, 761; see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Consent Orders 
Settling Charges That Four Paint Companies Misled Consumers Through Claims Their 
Products Are Emission- and VOC-Free (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2018/04/ftc-approves-final-consent-orders-settling-charges-four-paint. 
98. Moonlight Slumber, LLC, 164 F.T.C. 869 (2017) (Complaint), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-164/vol164complete.pdf.  
Moonlight Slumber, LLC is now doing business as “Moonlight.” 
99. Id. at 874.  
100. Id. at 870, ¶ 4(a)–(e).  The FTC alleged that, in reality, “[t]he substantial majority of 
content in Respondent’s Starlight Simplicity and Little Star mattresses is non-
organic . . . . Only the mattress ribbon, a minor component of the mattresses, is purely 
organic.”  Id. at 871, ¶ 6.  It continued: “Most of Respondent’s mattresses contain cores made 
wholly or substantially of polyurethane, a non-natural material made almost entirely from 
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2. Moonlight Slumber had falsely claimed that testing had proven its 
mattresses do not emit VOCs, when in fact there was no testing to 
substantiate that claim.101 
3. Moonlight Slumber had represented that its mattresses were certified 
by Green Safety Shield, but “failed to disclose . . . adequately that 
the Green Safety Shield is its own designation” and not a 
certification from an independent third party.102 
On October 4, 2017, the FTC published a Federal Register notice seeking 
public comment regarding the draft Consent Agreement and Consent 
Order.103  During the thirty-day comment period, the FTC received only one 
comment, which was from the OTA.104  The OTA expressed support for the 
proposed Consent Agreement, remarking that “[c]onsumer demand for 
organic products continues to show double-digit growth with no signs of 
slowing,” and that this “provides great incentive for marketers to take 
advantage of the term ‘organic’ and apply it to products that may contain 
little to no ‘organic’ material.”105  In its comment, the OTA suggested that 
the FTC develop a draft policy statement regarding “organic” claims for 
nonagricultural and partially nonagricultural products, noting that these 
products are outside the scope of the USDA’s jurisdiction under the NOP,106 
leaving a “largely undefined and unregulated space.”107 
 
 
isocyanates and polyols derived from petrochemicals.”  Id. ¶ 7.  In addition, the FTC asserted 
that “the latex used in the core for the Little Star mattress is not a natural material, but is 
synthetic.”  Id.  Further, “[t]he foams used in Respondent’s Starlight Supreme, Starlight 
Sleepwell, Starlight Dream, Little Star, Little Dreamer, Little Dreamer Deluxe, and Little 
Angel mattresses contain little or no plant-based material.”  Id. ¶ 8. 
101. See id. at 873 (“Respondent has represented . . . that [its] mattresses will not emit any 
substance, including volatile organic compounds.  In fact, Respondent did not possess and 
rely upon a reasonable basis to substantiate that its mattresses will not emit any substance, 
including volatile organic compounds.”). 
102. Id. at 874. 
103. Moonlight Slumber, LLC; Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,243, 
46,243 (Oct. 4, 2017). 
104. Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Consent Order in Moonlight Slumber, 
LLC, Advertising Case (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/20
17/12/ftc-approves-final-consent-order-moonlight-slumber-llc. 
105. Letter from Gwendolyn Wyard, Vice President, Organic Trade Ass’n, to Off. of the 
Sec’y, FTC 1, 4 (Oct. 27, 2017), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2017
/10/00002-141568.pdf (commenting on FTC’s proposed consent agreement to settle charges). 
106. Id. at 2–3. 
107. Id. at 1. 
08. ALR 72.3_ROTMAN (ARTICLE) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2020  11:30 PM 
2020] THE CASE FOR STRONGER REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING 437 
The Consent Order, entered on December 11, 2017, prohibits Moonlight 
Slumber from continuing to engage in deceptive environmental marketing 
practices.108  It also provides that Moonlight Slumber may be liable for civil 
penalties for future violations of the Consent Order.109 
Truly Organic involves similar issues.  The USDA started the Truly Organic 
investigation, with later involvement by the FTC.  Truly Organic Inc. (Truly 
Organic), a Florida corporation, packages and labels personal care products 
(e.g., body wash, baby lotion, and personal lubricant) and homecare 
products (e.g., cleaning spray), and markets them to consumers in the 
United States.110  Truly Organic manufactures some of these products itself; 
it also purchases some finished products from wholesalers and packages 
them for retail sale.111  Truly Organic sells these products on its website as 
well as on third-party websites.112 
On September 13, 2019, the FTC filed a complaint against Truly 
Organic, invoking § 5(a) of the FTC Act.113  The complaint alleged that, from 
2015 to 2019, Truly Organic falsely advertised its products as “certified 
organic,” “USDA organic,” “USDA certified organic,” and containing 
“100% organic ingredients”—when, in fact, none of Truly Organic’s 
products had ever been certified as organic by the USDA NOP, and some 
do not contain any organic ingredients at all.114  It further alleged that, in 
addition to directly making these false claims, Truly Organic had distributed 
press kits to third parties (e.g., social media influencers) containing the false 
claims, which the third parties then disseminated on social media channels.115 
The complaint further claimed that in 2016, the USDA had issued a 
Notice of Warning to Truly Organic and its Chief Executive Officer, Maxx 
 
108. Moonlight Slumber, LLC, 164 F.T.C. 869, 901–04 (2017). 
109. Id. 
110. Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief ¶¶ 6,9, FTC v. Truly 
Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2019). 
111. See id. (noting Truly Organic’s “products fall into two categories: (1) products that they 
‘make’ by purchasing wholesale bath, beauty, and home products online, adding ingredients to 
increase visual appeal, and repackaging; and (2) ‘bath bombs’ and soaps that they purchase as 
finished products from online wholesalers and resell at a substantial markup”). 
112. See id. ¶ 10 (pointing out websites such as “ulta.com, urbanoutfitters.com, 
nordstrom.com, and aerie.com”). 
113. See id. at ¶ 28 (“Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prohibits ‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.’”). 
114. Id. at ¶ 31.  The Complaint also alleges false “vegan” claims.  
115. See id. at ¶¶ 16, 33–34 (“Defendants have distributed the promotional 
materials . . . to third parties for use in the marketing and sale of Defendants’ products.  In so 
doing, Defendants have provided the means and instrumentalities to these third parties for 
the commission of deceptive acts or practices.”). 
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Harley Appelman, stating that Truly Organic was not “a certified organic 
operation” and, therefore, was prohibited from advertising its products as 
“USDA organic” or “certified organic.”116  The complaint alleged that, 
despite the Notice of Warning, Truly Organic continued its deceptive 
“organic” marketing campaign until May 2019, when the FTC informed the 
company that it had begun an investigation.117 
On September 18, 2019, five days after the FTC filed the complaint, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a 
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment and 
Order Closing Case.118  The Order prohibited Truly Organic and Appelman 
from making false or unsubstantiated “organic,” “vegan,” or other health or 
environmental claims regarding their products in the future and from 
providing third parties the means and instrumentalities to do so.119  The 
Order imposed a monetary penalty of $1.76 million—the FTC’s first penalty 
collected for false “organic” claims.120  The Commission voted 5-0 to 
approve the filing of the complaint and proposed Stipulated Final Order.  
Commissioner Rohit Chopra issued a separate statement emphasizing that 
Truly Organic’s conduct had “distorted competition for organic products, 
inflicting harm on honest producers” as well as consumers.121 
As shown by the history of FTC enforcement actions involving 
environmental marketing, there has never been a lack of unscrupulous 
marketers that are willing to deceive consumers to gain an unfair advantage 
over competitors.  While Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic may be extreme 
examples of deceptive “organic” claims in marketing made at the expense of 
vulnerable populations, such as babies and pregnant women, it is unrealistic 
to assume that they are isolated cases.  More likely, they are emblematic of 
the latest trend in greenwashing—the misuse of buzzwords like “organic” 
and “vegan”—which the FTC must take further action to address. 
 
116. See id. at ¶ 18 (“On June 16, 2016, the USDA issued a Notice of Warning to 
Defendants confirming that Truly Organic ‘is not a certified organic operation, but 
represented its products as such on product labels and company website.’”). 
117. See id. at ¶ 23 (“Until the FTC contacted Defendants in May 2019, Truly 
Organic’s website incorporated the statement ‘100% Organic Ingredients—Truly Organic’ 
in its metadata.”). 
118. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment; Order 
Closing Case, FTC v. Truly Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2019). 
119. Id. at 2–3. 
120. Id. at 3. 
121. Press Release, Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Statement on In re Truly Organic (Sept. 
19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1544655/commis
isoner_rohit_chopra_statement_on_truly_organic_sept_19_2019.pdf. 
08. ALR 72.3_ROTMAN (ARTICLE) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2020  11:30 PM 
2020] THE CASE FOR STRONGER REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING 439 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Greenwashing hurts business competitors, consumers, and the 
environment.  It is well documented that even isolated instances of 
greenwashing can make consumers skeptical of all products marketed as 
“green,” and can lead consumers to question not only the supposed eco-
attributes of those products, but all claims about those products made in 
marketing materials.122  Purchasers of “green” products are not the only 
ones who are affected; exposure to fraudulent “green” marketing materials 
can leave broad swathes of consumers confused, dissatisfied, and disloyal.123  
If allowed to continue, greenwashing can ultimately lead consumers to 
avoid products that are marketed as “green.”124  Frankly, this is a shame 
given the magnitude of environmental challenges and the importance and 
urgency of reducing the environmental impact of consumptive activities. 
Because greenwashing can have far-reaching impacts on consumer 
purchasing, the problem of fraudulent or deceptive “organic” claims 
regarding nonagricultural products affects more than the businesses and 
consumers operating in that sector.  Many businesses and numerous 
consumers are impacted due to the effect on consumer decisionmaking that 
can then artificially affect competition and opportunity. 
This section of the Essay offers three recommendations for reducing 
unfounded and deceptive “organic” claims in the marketing of 
nonagricultural products.  First, the FTC should take immediate steps to 
tighten its investigation and enforcement oversight regarding “organic” 
claims and to improve coordination with the USDA NOP.  Second, the FTC 
should add provisions regarding “organic” claims to its next revision of the 
Green Guides, which is slated for revision in 2022.  Finally, in the longer 
term, the FTC should consider making the Green Guides into legislative 
rules, similar to the NOP regulations. 
A. Enhanced FTC Oversight of “Organic” Claims and Improved Coordination  
with USDA NOP 
The gap in regulatory oversight of “organic” claims for nonagricultural 
products exposed by Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic needs to be closed.  
As those cases showed, the FTC’s historical approach of deferring to the 
USDA NOP on all things “organic” left the door open for fraudulent and 
 
122. Hendy Mustiko Aji & Bayu Sutikno, The Extended Consequence of Greenwashing: Perceived 
Consumer Skepticism, 10 INT’L J. BUS. & INFO. 433, 461, 463 (2015). 
123. Marta Pagán Martínez et. al, Fuzzy Inference System to Study the Behavior of the Green 
Consumer Facing the Perception of Greenwashing, 242 J. CLEANER PROD., Aug. 31, 2019, at 20. 
124. Id. 
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deceptive claims.  The FTC and USDA should continue to work towards 
improved coordination in their oversight of “organic” products.  To this 
end, the agencies should more clearly delineate what constitutes an 
“agricultural product” within the scope of the NOP and what does not.  
Although the NOP regulations define “agricultural product,”125 the 
Moonlight Slumber and Truly Organic cases reveal a gray area in which neither 
the FTC nor the USDA has been proactively addressing fraudulent or 
deceptive claims. 
Apart from coordination with the USDA, there are some steps that the 
FTC could—if it has sufficient desire and resources to do so—implement on 
its own to help curb fraudulent “organic” and other “green” claims.  If 
budgetary conditions allow, the FTC could focus its hiring efforts on 
additional technical staff with expertise in environmental sustainability who 
could review environmental claims in marketing and analyze their potential 
environmental impact.  Also, the FTC could launch a task force to tackle 
deceptive environmental claims, as it has done recently for other areas of 
concern, such as anticompetitive behaviors in the technology industry.126  At 
a minimum, in the short term, the FTC could develop a webpage that offers 
the public a portal for submitting complaints and viewing investigation and 
enforcement reports, similar to the USDA NOP website.127 
B. Revising the Green Guides to Address “Organic” Claims 
According to the regulatory review schedule published in the Federal 
Register in May 2019, the FTC plans to initiate the next revision of the 
Green Guides in 2022.128  The foundation is well laid for the addition of a 
section on “organic” claims.  As explained in Section III above, the FTC 
considered adding a section on “organic” claims in the 2012 revision of the 
Green Guides, but ultimately decided not to on grounds that it had 
insufficient evidence that consumers were being deceived by “organic” 
 
125. As noted above, 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2019) provides that an “agricultural product” is 
an “agricultural commodity or product, whether raw or processed, including any commodity 
or product derived from livestock, that is marketed in the United States for human or 
livestock consumption.” 
126. Press Release, FTC, FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to 
Monitor Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology. 
127. See National Organic Program, USDA, https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/program
s-offices/national-organic-program (last visited Aug. 12, 2020). 
128. Regulatory Review Schedule, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,746, 18,747 (May 2, 2019). 
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claims.129  The findings of the subsequent FTC/USDA co-funded study and 
public roundtable, together with the fraud exposed in the Moonlight Slumber 
and Truly Organic cases, strongly support the FTC including guidance on 
“organic” claims in the next revision of the Green Guides.  In so doing, the 
FTC could consider developing an accreditation and certification program 
for manufacturers of “organic” nonagricultural products similar to the 
certification of “organic” growers by accredited certifiers under the NOP, 
which has largely been successful in maintaining the integrity of “organic” 
claims for agricultural products.130 
The FTC has, in fact, already begun revising its industry-specific 
interpretive guidance documents to include “organic” claims.  In 2018, the 
FTC revised its Guides for the Jewelry, Precious Metals, and Pewter 
Industries (Jewelry Guides) to include a new section on “organic” pearls.  The 
Jewelry Guides, like the Green Guides, is an interpretive guidance document 
that advises marketers without being a binding regulation.131  The Jewelry 
Guides now state that “it is unfair or deceptive to use the term ‘organic’ to 
describe, identify, or refer to an imitation pearl, unless the term is qualified 
in such a way as to make clear that the product is not a natural or cultured 
pearl.”132  By updating the Jewelry Guides to address “organic” pearls, the 
FTC has taken an initial step towards reducing fraudulent and deceptive 
claims for nonagricultural products. 
Importantly, the FTC has shown an intention to keep abreast of changing 
conditions in the marketplace.  In fall 2018 and spring 2019, the FTC held 
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (CCP 
Hearings).  These hearings primarily focused on the FTC’s role in the face of 
rapidly-changing technology, with many topics centering on antitrust law and 
consumer privacy and protection.133  Although the CCP Hearings did not 
specifically address environmental marketing or “organic” claims, they 
indicate that the FTC wants to keep pace with changing consumer preferences 
and to be mindful of the accompanying new opportunities for fraud. 
 
129. Green Guides Press Release, supra note 74 (stating that it lacked a sufficient basis, 
including consumer perception evidence, upon which to provide guidance on certain organic 
claims); see also BUREAU OF ECON. & BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., supra note 77, at 5. 
130. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.400 (2019). 
131. 16 C.F.R. § 23.0(d) (2019). 
132. 16 C.F.R. § 23.21(e). 
133. See Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FTC, 
www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection (last visited Aug. 11, 2020) 
(“The Federal Trade Commission held a series of public hearings during the fall 2018–spring 
2019 examining whether broad-based changes in the economy, evolving business practices, 
new technologies, or international developments might require adjustments to competition 
and consumer protection law, enforcement priorities, and policy.”). 
08. ALR 72.3_ROTMAN (ARTICLE) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2020  11:30 PM 
442 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [72:3 
  
C. Formalizing the Green Guides as Legislative Rules 
Looking further forward, the FTC should consider formalizing the 
Green Guides as legislative rules.  The FTC’s decision in the early 1990s 
to tackle rampant fraud and deception in “green” marketing through an 
industry guide, rather than a binding regulation, made sense because it 
allowed the FTC to begin addressing the problem more quickly.  But for 
the past thirty years, the Green Guides have remained in an ill-defined, 
hybrid status as de facto rules that do not actually have the force of law.  As 
discussed above, this has led to problems regarding preemption, 
enforcement, and judicial review. 
Now is the time to give the Green Guides more teeth—not only to help 
prevent fraudulent “organic” claims, but to curb whatever yet-unseen 
greenwashing tactics lay around the corner.  The FTC’s limited 
investigation, enforcement, and legal resources could be deployed more 
effectively if the Green Guides were legally binding and independently 
enforceable, without requiring a separate showing by the FTC that each 
Green Guides violation is also a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act.  The NOP, 
which has been largely successful at preventing fraudulent and deceptive 
claims regarding organic agricultural products, is implemented pursuant to 
binding USDA regulations.  Many scholars agree that formalizing the Green 
Guides as binding regulations would provide a variety of benefits for both 
the marketplace and consumers.134 
As discussed in Section II, the rulemaking process prescribed by the FTC 
Improvement Act is lengthy, involving advanced notice of the proposed 
rulemaking and the potential for extensive written and oral testimony.135  To 
this end, the most efficient option for the Green Guides to become legislative 
rules is through a congressional mandate.  If Congress passes a statute 
directing the FTC to promulgate a specific regulation, then the FTC is 
exempt from many rulemaking procedural requirements.  At present, there 
does not appear to be any activity in Congress regarding such a bill.  In the 
absence of a congressional mandate, the FTC would be required to follow 
the FTC Improvement Act rulemaking process when making the Green 
 
134. See Lauren C. Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal 
Regulation, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 697–98 (2006); Jessica Fliegelman, Note, The Next 
Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1037 (2010); Gibson, supra note 5, at 434. 
135. For reference, it took the FTC nine years to promulgate the Credit Practices Rule 
pursuant to this process—by which point, elements of it were already outdated.  See Paul H. 
Luehr, Comment, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulating 
Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 311, 329 (1992). 
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Guides into legislative rules.  Although it is unlikely that the FTC will take 
action to formalize the Green Guides in the current deregulatory political 
climate,136 the upcoming elections makes this a space to watch. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay argues that more robust oversight by the FTC is needed to 
address the persistent problem of fraudulent and deceptive environmental 
claims in marketing.  Because even isolated instances of greenwashing can 
make consumers skeptical of all products that are marketed as “green,” it is 
critical—from the standpoints of consumer protection, business competition, 
and environmental sustainability—to curb these abuses. 
This Essay offers three recommendations.  First, it calls for improved 
coordination between the FTC and USDA regarding “organic” claims for 
nonagricultural products.  Second, it makes a strong case for including 
guidelines for “organic” claims in the 2022 revision of the Green Guides.  
Finally, it argues that the FTC should work to formalize the Green Guides 
as binding regulations, rather than nonbinding interpretive guidance, as the 
USDA has done for the NOP regulations. 
If implemented, these recommendations may have far-reaching, positive 
impacts on consumer practices.  More robust regulatory oversight of 
environmental marketing will prevent fraud, bolster consumer demand for 
sustainable goods and services, and incentivize manufacturers to innovate in 
order to meet this demand, all at a time when the stakes could not be higher. 
 
136. See President Donald J. Trump’s Deregulatory Actions are Benefitting American Families, Workers, 
and Businesses, WHITE HOUSE (June 28, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statement
s/president-donald-j-trumps-historic-deregulatory-actions-are-benefiting-american-families-
workers-and-businesses.  Although the FTC is an independent agency within the Executive 
Branch, the President has a degree of influence over its Commissioners and agenda.  Id. 
